Jobs in Education and Research

Here’s part four or four, for those of you whose New Year’s resolution is to get a job in International Relations… This is the “Careers in IR” section from my textbook (Joshua S. Goldstein and Jon C. Pevehouse, International Relations, 10th ed. 2012-2013 Update).

educ bob krist corbisSUMMARY
Jobs in teaching and research offer freedom to pursue ideas and work with colleagues, but require years of schooling.

BENEFITS AND COSTS
People follow various paths to an interest in teaching and researching in the field of international relations. Your own professor or instructor is likely to have a unique story about how he or she became interested in international affairs.

One advantage of an academic and research career, whether at a teaching-oriented institution or a large research university, is intellectual freedom. One can spend a career approaching a variety of topics that are interesting and constantly evolving, that may involve travel abroad for fieldwork, and that may let you network with hundreds of colleagues interested in similar topics.

Most research positions (e.g., in think tanks) are different in two respects. First, these jobs often give more direction to an individual in terms of the research to be performed. Second, there is little or no teaching involved. Still, for those interested in IR research, such jobs can result in a wider dissemination of one’s work to a broader audience that often includes policy makers.

To teach IR at an advanced level or to perform research for think tanks and government agencies usually requires an advanced degree—nearly always a masters degree, often a doctorate (Ph.D.). Masters degree programs often take between one and two years, while a Ph.D. in international relations usually takes a minimum of five years. Often, students take time off between their undergraduate and graduate educations to travel internationally or get work experience to hone their interests. Of course, many students never return to extend their education if they find a job that allows them to achieve their personal and career goals.

Finally, in completing most advanced degrees, a large amount of self-direction is necessary. Coursework is only one part of masters or Ph.D. programs: a thesis is also required. Writing a thesis requires you to work on your own time schedule, balancing other duties (such as work as a teaching or research assistant) that can easily crowd out your own work. Many who complete the coursework for an advanced degree do not finish their thesis or take many years to do so.

SKILLS TO HONE
Whether one wants to pursue an advanced degree for the purposes of teaching in an academic setting or engaging in applied research, there are important skill sets to develop. First and foremost is critical thinking. Scholars and researchers must consider many alternatives as answers to questions, while being able to evaluate the validity or importance of those alternatives. Second is writing. Before, during, and after producing a thesis, writing is a key skill for academics and researchers. Finally, think about developing a set of applied skills to use as a toolbox while analyzing questions. The contents of this toolbox might include other languages to facilitate fieldwork abroad. It could include statistics and data skills to facilitate quantitative analysis. Or it could include mathematics to use game theoretic models. No matter which tools you emphasize, specialized skills will help you answer research questions, whether as part of the academy or in a private or governmental research organization.

RESOURCES

  • The Chronicle of Higher Education (weekly). Online at chronicle.com/
  • American Political Science Assoc. Earning a PhD in Political Science. 4th ed. Washington, D.C., 2004.
  • Ernest J. Wilson. Is There Really a Scholar-Practitioner Gap? An Institutional Analysis. PS: Political Science and Politics, January 2007.

http://www.apsanet.org
http://www.apsia.org
http://www.isanet.org

Jobs in Nongovernmental Organizations

Part three for those of you whose New Year’s resolution is to get a job in International Relations… I’m posting the “Careers in IR” section from my textbook (Joshua S. Goldstein and Jon C. Pevehouse, International Relations, 10th ed. 2012-2013 Update).  This is the third of four parts:  Government and Diplomacy; International Business; Nongovernmental Organizations; and Education and Research.

afp redcross vladimir valishviliSUMMARY
Jobs in NGOs provide personally rewarding experiences for those willing to work hard for a cause, but pay poorly and are hard to obtain.

BENEFITS AND COSTS
Nearly 30,000 NGOs exist, and that number grows daily. Thousands of individuals are interested in working in these organizations. Although all NGOs are different, many perform multiple functions: working in developing countries regarding a variety of issues; public outreach at home and abroad; lobbying governments to change their policies; designing projects to solve problems and attempting to find funding for their implementation.

Working for an NGO has many benefits. Workers often find themselves surrounded by others concerned about the same issues: improving the environment, protecting human rights, advancing economic development, or promoting better health care. The spirit of camaraderie can be exhilarating and rewarding.

While working for an NGO can be extremely rewarding personally, it is rarely rewarding financially. Most NGOs are nonprofit operations that pay workers meagerly for long hours. Moreover, many smaller NGOs engage in a constant fight for funding from governments, think tanks, private foundations, or individuals. The process of fundraising can be quite time consuming.

Despite the large number of NGOs, relatively low pay, and long hours, finding a job with an NGO can be difficult. One key is to be specific. Try to narrow down your interests in terms of substantive areas (e.g., human rights, environment) and/or geographic region. Also think about whether you want to work in your own country or abroad. Positions abroad may be more rewarding but are in lower supply and higher demand.

SKILLS TO HONE
NGOs are looking for selfstarters. Most have little time and few resources for training.  Basic office skills (e.g., computer expertise) are essential, but employees also need to cover a range of duties every day. Anything and everything is in your job description. Writing and communication skills are key, especially when fundraising is part of the job. Foreign language skills also matter since many NGOs maintain or work with field offices abroad.

Often, NGOs ask potential employees to volunteer for a period while they train, before being hired. Increasingly, some companies place workers in an NGO or volunteer opportunity for a price. By paying to work, you can gain a probationary period to develop your skills and familiarize yourself with the operation so as to become efficient before going on the payroll.

Finally, in cities where NGOs cluster (e.g., Washington, D.C.), personal networks play an important role in finding good opportunities. Workers often move from one organization to another. For this reason, many volunteer or accept jobs with NGOs not in their immediate area of interest to gain experience and contacts, which can help future career advancement.

RESOURCES

  • Sherry Mueller. Careers in Nonprofit and Educational Organizations. In Careers in International Affairs. 7th ed. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown School of Foreign Service, 2003.
  • Richard M. King. From Making a Profit to Making a Difference: How to Launch Your New Career in Nonprofits. River Forest, IL: Planning/Communications, 2000.

http://www.ngo.org/links/index.htm
http://www.idealist.org
http://www.wango.org/resources.aspx?section=ngodir

Jobs in International Business

For those of you whose New Year’s resolution is to get a job in International Relations, I’m posting the “Careers in IR” section from my textbook (Joshua S. Goldstein and Jon C. Pevehouse, International Relations, 10th ed. 2012-2013 Update).  This is the second of four parts:  Government and Diplomacy; International Business; Nongovernmental Organizations; and Education and Research.

intlbiz andersen-ros brandx gettySUMMARY
Jobs in international business offer high pay, interesting work, and demanding hours for those with language and cultural skills.

BENEFITS AND COSTS
As the pace and scope of globalization have accelerated, opportunities to work in international business have blossomed. For many large companies, the domestic/global distinction has ceased to exist. This new context provides opportunities and challenges for potential employees.

Careers in international business offer many advantages. Business jobs can pay substantially more than those in governments or NGOs and can open opportunities to travel extensively and network globally. Foreign-based jobs mean relocation to another country to work and immerse oneself in another culture.

However, such a career choice also has potential costs. Many jobs require extensive hours, grueling travel, and frequent relocation. As with any job, promotion and advancement may fall victim to external circumstances such as global business cycles. And these jobs can be especially hard on families.

International opportunities arise in many business sectors. Banking, marketing (public relations), sales, and computing/telecommunications have seen tremendous growth in recent years. These jobs fall into three broad categories: (1) those located domestically, yet involving significant interactions with firms abroad; (2) domestic jobs working for foreign-based companies; and (3) those based abroad, for foreign or domestic firms.

SKILLS TO HONE
One key to landing in the international business world is to develop two families of skills: those related to international relations and those related to business operations. Traditional MBA (Masters in Business Administration) and business school programs will be helpful for all three types of jobs, yet for jobs based abroad, employers often also look for a broader set of skills taught in economics, political science, and communications. Thus, not only  traditional business skills, but language and cultural skills, are essential. Employers look for those who have knowledge of a country’s human and economic geography as well as culture. Experience with study abroad, especially including working abroad, can help show an ability to adapt and function well in other cultures. Strong analytical and especially writing abilities also matter greatly to employers.

Research also helps in landing a job. Employers often look for knowledge of a particular industry or company, in order to make best use of an employee’s language and cultural skills. Of course, while experience in non-international business never hurts, be mindful that the practices, customs, and models of business in one country may not apply well abroad. Crosscultural skills combined with substantive business knowledge in order to translate the operational needs of companies from the business world to the global realm are highly valued.

RESOURCES

  • Edward J. Halloran. Careers in International Business. 2nd ed. NY: McGraw-Hill, 2003.
  • Deborah Penrith, ed. The Directory of Jobs and Careers Abroad. 12th ed. Oxford, UK: Vacation Work Publications, 2005.

http://www.rileyguide.com/internat.html
http://jobs.goabroad.com/
http://www.transitionsabroad.com/listings/work/careers/index.shtml

Jobs in Government and Diplomacy

For those of you whose New Year’s resolution is to get a job in International Relations, I’m posting the “Careers in IR” section from my textbook (Joshua S. Goldstein and Jon C. Pevehouse, International Relations, 10th ed. 2012-2013 Update).  This is the first of four parts:  Government and Diplomacy; International Business; Nongovernmental Organizations; and Education and Research.

ciaSUMMARY
Jobs in government and diplomacy offer team players the chance to affect policy, but require patience with large bureaucracies.

BENEFITS AND COSTS
Both governments and intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) play key roles in international relations and employ millions of people with interests and training in IR. Despite differences between careers in IGOs and governments, there are numerous similarities. Both are hierarchical organizations, with competitive and highly regulated working environments. Whether in the U.S. State Department or the UN, entrance into and promotion in these organizations is regulated by exams, performance evaluations, and tenure with the organization. Another similarity lies in the challenges of being pulled in many directions concerning policies. Governments face competing pressures of public opinion, constituencies, and interests groups—each with distinct policy opinions. IGOs also deal with interest groups (such as NGOs), but an IGO’s constituents are states, which in many cases disagree among themselves. Many employees of IGOs or governments thrive on making decisions that influence policies. Both work environments also attract coworkers with deep interests in international affairs, and the resulting networks of contracts can bring professional and intellectual rewards. Finally, jobs in governments or IGOs may involve travel or living abroad, which many enjoy. However, promotion can be slow and frustrating. Usually, only individuals with advanced degrees or technical specializations achieve non–entry level positions. It can take years to climb within the organization and the process may involve working in departments far from your original interests. In addition, both IGOs and governments are bureaucracies with formal rules and procedures, requiring great patience. Employees often express frustration that initiative and “thinking outside the box” are not rewarded.

SKILLS TO HONE The key to working in IGOs or government is to get your foot in the door. Be flexible and willing to take entry positions that are not exactly in your area of interest. For example, the State Department is only one of many parts of the U.S. government that deal with IR. Do not assume that to work in foreign affairs, one must be a diplomat. Foreign language training is also important, especially for work in large IGOs with many field offices. The ability to work well in groups and to network within and across organizations is an important asset. People who can strengthen lines of communication can gain support from many places in an organization. Finally, strong analytical and writing abilities are extremely important. Both IGOs and governments deal with massive amounts of information daily. The ability to analyze information (even including mathematical or computational analysis) and to write clear, concise interpretations will make one invaluable.

RESOURCES
Shawn Dorman. Inside a U.S. Embassy: How the Foreign Service Works for America. 2nd ed. Washington, D.C.: American Foreign Service Assoc., 2003.
Linda Fasulo. An Insider’s Guide to the UN. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005.
http://jobs.un.org
http://careers.state.gov
http://www.opm.gov/job_seekers/

Benghazi — Truth vs. Politics

Call me old-fashioned but I still believe that truth and falsehood exist; that with some effort a nation’s policymaking and political establishment can determine one from the other; and that any nation that fails to do so when it comes to foreign policy — with such huge stakes and so many lives on the line — puts itself in mortal danger. I guess it’s my Realist streak.

Once upon a time, and here I reveal how old I am, American foreign policy managed, not always but often, to rise above politics. There was this quaint concept called the “bipartisan consensus” with its poetic mantra, “Politics stops at the water’s edge.”  The many erroneous or wrong-headed policies of the time generally came out of ignorance, especially of new developments in a changing world, rather than willful disregard of facts. It took a while to realize that nuclear weapons were not just very big artillery shells, that Vietnam was not the same kind of war as WWII, and that China and the Soviet Union might both be communist but not necessarily allied, for instance.

In the past decade or so, however, facts and truths seem to have gone out of style altogether. Partisan politics drives everything. Foreign policy discussions play out without questioning the underlying assumptions even when the latter are totally unfounded. And this is not happening just on minor or obscure issues, but the most important ones. When we invaded Iraq (leaving aside whether that was such a bright idea), the number of troops needed to occupy the country could be calculated based on past experiences, such as the forces that successfully kept the peace in the Balkans just a few years earlier. But when the head of the Army, Eric Shinseki, provided that number, the political leadership just pushed him aside and said, oh no, we don’t like that number, we’ll do it with far less. The result was a costly disaster for U.S. foreign policy.

Another example: political leaders and the public assume that levels of violence and threat in the world are increasing, when in fact hard evidence shows the opposite to be true (see my book). As a result, the USA spends more on the military than during the Cold War, spending that is helping drive the country into deep debt and economic malaise. It’s not just that we can’t afford it, but that we don’t need it. Yet political leaders talk on about the need to keep up military spending to face these terrible new threats. And speaking of new threats, our political leaders constantly harp on the threat from a rising China, conveniently forgetting that China has not fought a single military battle in 25 years. Not one. Why? It’s not in their national interest. Do we Americans remember that old concept, “national interest?”

Now comes the latest doomed stand for Truth — the dispute over the attack on our consulate in Benghazi, Libya. Was it a protest against the anti-Muslim video that went wrong and turned violent?  Or was it a premeditated attack by al Qaeda timed for the anniversary of 9/11?  This debate goes on and on and on, the Energizer Bunny of inane foreign policy discussions.  Politicians and media, please just shut up and listen!  We know the answer!  It’s not a debate, it’s not a mystery, and it’s not exactly either of the above stories.

We’ve known the full story for at least six weeks, since New York Times reporter David Kirkpatrick published it after interviewing the eyewitnesses and participants in Benghazi. Yes, published it not in a fly-by-night blog or a partisan rag, but in the New York Times. Does anybody read it anymore? “To those on the ground, the circumstances of the attack are hardly a mystery,” he wrote.

And this is what happened:  A local prominent Islamist armed militant group called Ansar al-Shariah has openly operated in Benghazi for some time. They are radical Islamists like al Qaeda, but are focused on local aims, not global attacks on America. “Other Benghazi militia leaders who know the group say its leaders and ideology are all homegrown,” wrote Kirkpatrick. Because Libya does not have good governance yet, after the overthrow of its longtime dictator Moammar Gaddafi last year, there are many of these armed militias roaming around and controlling various territories within the country.

Last September 11, without a thought to the meaning of that date and without prior planning, the members of Ansar al-Shariah watched news coverage of a protest in Cairo against the offensive anti-Muslim video. They became enraged, grabbed their automatic rifles and rocket-propelled grenades, and attacked the American consulate. The hundreds of attackers overwhelmed the defenses and burned the building. U.S. ambassador Chris Stevens was inside and died of smoke inhalation.

In the context of Libya, it was not such a strange action — a similar attack hit the Italian embassy in 2006 after a perceived Italian insult to the prophet Mohammed. But it did not in any way represent the Libyan people. After the attack, Libyans in Benghazi who realized they’d lost a great friend in Ambassador Stevens were outraged at Ansar al-Shariah, marching on its headquarters and throwing its members out.

Was it a terrorist act? Sure. A protest gone wrong? No. Was it a premeditated attack timed to 9/11? No. A spontaneous reaction to the video? Yes. An al Qaeda plot? No. Mysterious and complicated? No!

And by the way, what does any of this have to do with our UN ambassador Susan Rice, who repeated CIA talking points on Sunday talk shows (points that had omitted references to Ansar’s phone calls, in which they bragged to their ideological cousins in “al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb” [North Africa], so that Ansar wouldn’t know we’re listening in)?

Author Tom Ricks (The Generals) went on Fox News recently and offered that  the Benghazi story had been “hyped” by Fox. They booted him off the air instantly. Ricks has also been making the media rounds in the wake of the Petraeus sex scandal, arguing that we should assess generals based on how well they fight wars, not their private lives. (His take is that Petraeus was a good general but that the same can’t be said for a lot of our other top brass who led us through Iraq and Afghanistan.)

Personally I’m ready to lay off the sex scandals, the political talking points, the ideological certainties, and have an adult conversation about some big issues our country faces. Like the war that’s still going on in Afghanistan. Like the defense budget. Like the Arab uprisings in Libya and across the region that have left unstable places groping their way toward democracy and prosperity. Unstable places where maybe an ambassador gets killed trying to help — but that’s not even the main point. Let’s start from facts and look to the big picture.

The world’s first published Realist was the Chinese military advisor Sun Tzu in ancient times (The Art of War). His idea of the best general was not the one who had the good character to resist sexual temptation, nor the most brave or aggressive one, nor the most cautious one. It was the general who could cooly calculate the costs and benefits of each course of action. And realize the other side was doing the same thing.

Costs and benefits. National interest. Fact-based assessments. Bipartisan consensus. These are the best elements of Realism, a school of thought that has many deficiencies but some enduring strengths as well. I’m not a Realist overall, but we could use a dose of it right now.

Back to the UN

Lost in the current focus on the Gaza conflict is the vow of the Palestinian Authority to seek an upgrade in the UN General Assembly from observer status to “nonmember state.” That campaign is supposed to start November 29. Israel calls it “unilateral” and has threatened drastic actions, and the U.S. Congress threatens to cut off funding to the UN if it happens.

These reactions are way over the top for an action that would make little tangible difference to the Israeli-Palestinian relationship (which has much bigger problems currently, if you hadn’t noticed). We’re talking about the status held by the Vatican, giving Palestine modest rights to participate in some international bodies. Mostly it would give the moderate Palestinian president, Mahmoud Abbas, something to show for his moderation after being sidelined in recent days by far more radical factions, primarily Hamas.

Are folks freaking out because Palestine would have the word “state” next to its name? Silly. The two-state solution, a Palestinian state living side by side with Israel, is supported at least in theory by the Israeli government, the Palestinian government, the Europeans, Russians, Chinese, Americans, the UN…  Who am I leaving out here?  (Oh right, it’s opposed by Hamas and the other radical groups shooting missiles at Israel. ) So if you favor a two-STATE solution, why not put STATE next to Palestine?  Nobody will die — which is more than you can say for current policy.

I supported using the UN to address the Palestine issue a year ago, when it sought full membership. If we had passed a resolution then affirming the two-state solution, we might have headed off some of the trouble now engulfing Israel and Gaza. If we use the UN now and support Abbas, we might get ahead of the next wave of troubles that’s sure to hit.

In a recent interview I talked about the UN and peace, so in preparation for the upcoming “nonmember state” discussion at the UN I’m posting it here.

Note:  After completing the “Global Challenges in 2030” series, there wasn’t much of the semester left, so I’m blogging irregularly while focusing on a couple of book projects.

Michael W. Doyle — Democratizing World Politics

 [By Michael W. Doyle. Part of the series “Global Challenges in 2030”  (Goldstein & Pevehouse), January 2010.]

World politics has often been said to be a dangerous “jungle.” But are its dangers a product of the absence of a world policeman or the presence of rapacious state “beasts”? The most sensible answer is, surely, both. But while global governance tends to focus on creating new rules for the “jungle,” we should not neglect reforming the “beasts.” Indeed, one transformation that appears to have long-run prospects for reforming world politics into a much more governable world is changing the character of states: democratic liberalism.

Democratic liberalism embodies constitutional government, representative institutions, minority protections, human rights, and roles for private property and civil society. It is one of those great 19th-century revolutions, together with nationalism and industrialism, that is still transforming world politics. These revolutions began in Western Europe and have swept outward with revolutionary effects. Democratic liberalism grew from the handful of constitutional regimes in the early 19th century to more than 60 spread around the world today.

“Democracy is … a vital source of transformation with enormous upside and downside potential.” These citizens celebrate the narrow victory of the opposition presidential candidate in 2009 in Ghana, one of Africa’s few stable democracies.

Democratic liberalism is still a revolutionary idea. Its positive effects are profound and extensive, as this partial list suggests:

• It promotes peace and mutual respect among democratic peoples. For two centuries, democracies that are committed to the ideal of individual liberty and endowed with well-established constitutional governments have tended to maintain, and likely will continue to maintain, a reliable peace with each other.

• Democracy, at higher levels of participation, promotes human rights and decreases state repression. It also serves to protect the mass of a population from state indifference during a natural disaster, thus reducing the danger of large-scale famine.

• It tends to foster economic growth. Although there is no appreciable direct effect, democracy not only does not harm growth (as some have charged), it has robust, positive, indirect effects by increasing human capital (education, etc.), lowering inflation, reducing political instability, and enlarging economic freedom—all of which are positively associated with economic growth.

• Expanding the democratic franchise tends, overall, to reduce economic inequality as politicians respond to the majority’s demand for greater welfare. Being a democracy, however, is no cure-all. The very international respect for individual rights and shared commercial interests that establish grounds for peace among liberal democracies establishes grounds for additional conflict in relations between liberal and nonliberal societies, as they do in U.S.-Russian and U.S.-Chinese relations today. Liberal internationalism is no recipe; it needs constant, prudent vigilance to avoid crusades and misguided interventions. Liberal Britain, France, and the United States have been among the most expansionist empires, sometimes producing order and progress and at other times fostering chaos, oppression, and war. The “liberation” of Iraq is only the latest in these costly adventures.

Nor is becoming a democracy a cure-all. Globally, every step toward more democracy within countries reduces the chances of both international and civil war. That is the good news. But the good news needs to be qualified: where the rule of law and public institutions are weak, politicians will be tempted to use violence to achieve and hold office.

Democracy is thus a vital source of transformation with enormous upside and downside potential. The question remains: how to foster the first and avoid the second?

First, we need to avoid a repeat of the Bush administration’s “forced democratization.” Following the Iraq fiasco, it is unlikely to be repeated soon, but the ethical and practical lessons still need to be absorbed. Selfgovernment
should mean authentic “self” government, not laws and regulations imposed by foreigners, even if well-meaning. Democracy is not only government “for” and “of,” it is also government “by” the people. Unless the people see themselves as a people, are prepared to pay taxes, defend their borders, and abide by majority rule, democracy is not sustainable.

Second, we should also avoid attempts to replace the UN with leagues of democracies. It is a strategy of democratic association likely to do more harm than good. Few if any of the world’s major challenges can be met by dividing democratic sheep from nondemocratic goats. Effective trade negotiations and effective arms control need to include all the world’s major producers that are prepared to abide by agreed rules, whether they are democratic or not. Refusing to negotiate and shunning a potential Gorbachev or a new De Klerk is
not the best way to win their confidence.

Democratic transformation is best fostered peacefully. It spreads by good example, by incentives and assistance. Promoting democracy is best done indirectly through trade, investment, and foreign aid. These can help diversify societies. Diversified growing societies tend to demand responsive governance over the long run. Among the most powerful weapons in the arsenal for international democratic transformation—the shock troops of democratization—are students, tourists, and business investors.

For direct promotion, multilateral assistance is particularly useful because it frees the recipient organization from the taint of foreign control. The recently established UN Democracy Fund (UNDEF) has an especially significant role in this endeavor. Authorized at the 2005 World Summit in a unanimous General Assembly resolution, it distributes about $30 million per year, predominantly to civil society organizations who apply for a grant to promote measures such as voter education and mobilization.

Strategies like these are the best prospects for expanding the zone of peace among fellow democracies and reaping the benefits of democratization.

 

MICHAEL W. DOYLE is the Harold Brown Professor of International Affairs, Law and Political Science at Columbia University. Professor Doyle is currently one of the Secretary-General’s personal representatives and the chair of the board of UNDEF. These comments do not necessarily reflect the views of UNDEF, its donors, or the UN.

Daniel W. Drezner — Regulating Global Complexity

[By Daniel W. Drezner. Part of the series “Global Challenges in 2030”  (Goldstein & Pevehouse), January 2010.]

Outside of realists, mainstream international relations perspectives believe that the world benefits from complex interdependence. One of the biggest issues that international relations theorists will need to deal with in the coming decades, however, is dealing with the dark side of globalization.

With the end of the Cold War, the globalization phenomenon went truly global. At the same time, the number of banking and currency crises also began to mushroom. During the 1990s, the frequency of banking and currency crises rose to a level unseen since the interwar years. While most of these crises were concentrated in the developing world, with the Great Recession of 2008, instability went global as well. International markets in financial assets, food, and energy were buffeted by a series of shocks—and none of them functioned terribly well in response. This failure rattled even the most devout free market enthusiasts. Former Federal Reserve chairman Alan Greenspan made headlines when he admitted that his faith in the “intellectual edifice” of self-correcting markets had “collapsed.”

With the accelerating pace of technological innovation constantly reducing the transaction costs of cross-border trade, globalization is a fact regardless of how high governments set barriers to trade. How can the benefits of greater openness and greater interdependence be realized while minimizing the costs that come from economic crises?

“Interlocking financial markets, real-time information dissemination, and just-in-time inventory systems [have] magnified … any perturbation in the global economy.” This Hong Kong container port in 2008 hints at the complexity of these processes.

Economists have been debating the best way to answer that question since the start of the Great Recession, with little to show for it beyond some very heated rhetoric. Many commentators argued that the laissez-faire, efficient markets, self-regulation approach allowed systemic risk to bubble up. Free-marketers placed the blame on government policies that subsidized home mortgages and kept interest rates too low for too long. This debate has produced more heat than light.

Here’s a truly subversive thought—perhaps the problem with this debate is the extent to which the rest of the world listens to economists. Keynesian or monetarist, all economists preach the virtues of maximizing economic efficiency. For all economists, the be all and end all of their policy prognostications is “Pareto optimality”—a world in which no one can be made better off without making anyone worse off.

If one looks at the globalized economy through the lens of organizational theory, however, then one’s perspective begins to shift. Globalization has transformed the world economy into a complex, tightly coupled social system. A globalized economy is hideously complex, with interactions between different sectors that become clear only after the fact. For example, U.S. government officials did not anticipate the ways in which the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers would ripple across financial markets; other governments failed to understand how Lehman’s collapse affected their own financial sectors.

A globalized economy is also a tightly coupled organism—changes in one component of the economy have immediate effects on other sectors of the economy. The proliferation of interlocking financial markets, real-time information dissemination, and just-intime inventory systems has accelerated and, at times, magnified the impact of any perturbation in the global economy. The way in which the subprime mortgage crisis spread across national economies and from financial markets to the real economy demonstrates the speed with which a minor accident can metastasize into something far more serious.

Complex, tightly coupled systems are prone to what some scholars have labeled “normal accidents”—cascading catastrophes that grow naturally in the system. These systems also tend to have actors with a vested interest in avoiding change in the status quo. Unlike loosely coupled or less complex systems, the creation of safety mechanisms to try to prevent such a catastrophe often has unanticipated or debilitating effects.

Some counterintuitive notions come from thinking of the global economy as a complex system. For example, faith in regulatory solutions might be just as misguided as faith in efficient markets. Efforts to regulate capital markets might be well intentioned, but they might also have unanticipated effects precipitating an even bigger economic crash. This does not mean that no actions should be taken—but it does mean that the potential costs of regulation have been underestimated.

Another counterintuitive point is that because of complexity, sham agreements might actually be a good thing for the global economy. The natural political instinct is to “do something” in the wake of a crisis. A normal accidents perspective,  however, would argue that periodic financial crashes are something the world must live with. Politicians do not do terribly well with a “do nothing” message—so symbolic pledges on a number of issue areas can alleviate political pressure without bollixing up the global financial system.

Debates over how to regulate a complex global economy will persist for decades. An organizational lens leads to some unconventional thoughts. In addition to maximizing economic efficiency, policy makers will also want to think about robustness as a desirable outcome. Any regulation of a complex global economy should be concentrated on making a tightly coupled system more robust to shocks. This means adding some friction to markets that react quickly, in the hopes that contagion does not spread as quickly in the future. There are limits to this strategy—the world really does benefit from financial globalization—but that’s why something like a minimal tax on international capital movements makes some sense.

 

DANIEL W. DREZNER is professor of international politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. He is the author of All Politics Is Global (Princeton, 2007) and The Sanctions Paradox (Cambridge, 1999), and keeps a daily blog at foreignpolicy.com.

Andrew Moravcsik — Affirming Democracy in International Organizations

[By Andrew Moravcsik. Part of the series “Global Challenges in 2030”  (Goldstein & Pevehouse), January 2010.]

Are international organizations undemocratic? Many activists, politicians, and political scientists believe that globalization and global governance are reducing citizens and their elected politicians to rubber stamps. Decisions are made behind closed doors by networks of unelected diplomats, technocrats, and judges. Neither individual citizens nor national parliaments exercise meaningful oversight. Yale law professor Jed Rubenfeld has contrasted international organizations that are “bureaucratic, diplomatic, technocratic—everything but democratic” with the U.S. Constitution’s “process of popular deliberation and consent.”

In the United States, international organizations elicit complaints from left and right alike. Conservatives criticize activist lawyers, judges, and NGOs for seeking to import interventionist foreign standards—the death penalty, global warming standards, and gay rights—without running the gamut of the normal legislative process. Progressives worry about the unchecked influence of corporate interests, which appear to use multilateral organizations such as the WTO to protect profits at the expense of social, health, safety, and  environmental standards.

Many Europeans share sociologist Ralf Dahrendorf’s view that internationalization “invariably means a loss of democracy.” The European  Union’s recent and contentious effort to promulgate a “constitution” was launched in order to bring it “closer to its citizens” and provide “better  democratic scrutiny.” Yet the impression of illegitimacy was bolstered by referendum defeats in France, the Netherlands, and Ireland before a  watered-down version finally passed in 2009 as the Treaty of Lisbon.

“Even in the European Union, the world’s most ambitious international institution, around 90% of lawmaking remains under national control.” French laws mainly govern the owner, crew, and cargo of this barge passing the European Parliament building in Strasbourg.

Critics propose two remedies.  “Sovereigntists” would reassert national  sovereignty, reinforce  domestic control, and block multilateralization of  new issues. “Cosmopolitan democrats” would establish elections, parliaments, and other popular democratic institutions at the global and regional levels. While these criticisms seem intuitively plausible, closer scrutiny reveals important counterarguments.

National institutions impose tight control over international organizations. National governments decide most important questions by consensus,  affording each member government a role in either approving or blocking an action. In nearly all bodies, international officials remain weak and secretariats are small. Each government remains responsible to its population in accordance with domestic law. Citizens in democratic societies can reward or punish their governments for the decisions they take in international organizations, just as they would for any other decision. Issues such as payment of UN dues in the United States, compliance with IMF programs in Argentina, or ratification of a new EU constitution in Britain spark spirited domestic debates.

International institutions expand the scope of democratic choice. In an increasingly interdependent world, the advancement of one country’s national interest increasingly depends on policies adopted by foreign governments. If citizens wish to defend themselves against external enemies, set an effective environmental standard, or protect human rights at home, they must increasingly do so in cooperation with foreigners. International cooperation offers governments a chance to exchange unilateral policy discretion at home for expanded influence over the policies of foreign governments, thereby realizing vital domestic policy objectives that would otherwise be unachievable. A blanket refusal to delegate authority to multilateral institutions, as sovereigntists recommend, would not only be self-defeating, but would also arbitrarily restrict national democratic choice.

International institutions can improve domestic democratic processes. International institutions may be distant, but critics of multilateralism go to the opposite extreme: They idealize local democracy. National elections and other forms of political representation often contain serious biases and flaws, which international institutions can help correct. Even in European countries, where human rights standards are well established, international courts have imposed higher human rights protection in matters such as the death penalty, gay rights, and the right of asylum. Many international institutions help promote democracy. The WTO helps overcome special interest dominance of unilateral trade policy making.

Governments reserve the issues most salient to voters to themselves. Even in the European Union, the world’s most ambitious international institution, around 90 percent of lawmaking remains under national control. These include the most salient issues to citizens: taxing and spending, social welfare provision, health care, pensions, education, law enforcement, local infrastructure, and defense spending. Even at home, we often choose to delegate issues handled by international institutions—such as human rights protection, financial and regulatory policy, nuclear proliferation—to more independent and expert officials and judges. This is as it should be.

If international decisions remain under tight democratic control, why are multilateral institutions so widely perceived as “undemocratic”? In part, this perception reflects the relative unfamiliarity of such institutions and the latent nationalism of publics. But also, many criticisms of “undemocratic” international organizations are advanced by those who are seeking a rhetorical edge in domestic debates about the content of specific decisions. At least critics seem equally divided. The fact that such criticisms appear to come equally from both the left and the right suggests that international organizations are doing something right.

 

ANDREW MORAVCSIK is Professor of Politics and International Affairs, and Director of the European Union Program, at Princeton University’s Woodrow Wilson School. He has authored over 100 academic publications on European integration, transatlantic relations, international organizations, global human rights, international relations theory, and Asian regionalism. He is Non-Resident Senior Fellow of the Brookings Institution, Contributing Editor of Newsweek magazine, and Book Review Editor (Europe) of Foreign Affairs magazine. His policy experience includes service as an international trade negotiator for the U.S. Department of Commerce, special assistant to the Deputy Prime Minister of the Republic of Korea, and assistant in the press office of the European Commission.

Charli Carpenter — Securing the Seas

[By Charli Carpenter. Part of the series “Global Challenges in 2030”  (Goldstein & Pevehouse), January 2010.]

Forget Johnny Depp. Real-life maritime piracy is no laughing matter. According to the International Maritime Bureau (IMB), 78 vessels were boarded and 39 hijacked worldwide in the first half of 2009—an increase of nearly double from the previous year. Unlike the pirates of yore, today’s sea bandits use satellite technology to track their prey; sneak up alongside ships in speedboats; are armed with machine guns, rocket launchers, and grenades; and board vessels with grappling irons. Once aboard, pirates plunder or ransom cargo and terrorize crews.

All kinds of ships—yachts, freighters, cruise ships, supertankers—fall victim to attack. In 2008, a Ukrainian cargo ship laden with Russian tanks, ammunition, and other military equipment was captured by pirates and later ransomed for $3.2 million. Humanitarian shipments to famine-ravaged lands are favorite targets off the Horn of Africa, meaning piracy is not just bad news for maritime crews and arms merchants but also for hungry civilians—not to mention the entire system of international trade, since 90 percent of what consumers use travels by water. And there are significant concerns about the connections between piracy and international terrorism.

“Ultimately, action at the global level is necessary to protect shipping lanes and empower legitimate international actors to stamp out piracy.” Here, Turkish commandos in 2009 arrest pirates off the coast of Somalia.

Commentators have different views as to what drives this problem: grinding poverty that makes piracy look like easy money, technological changes that make it easy for non-state actors to take on states and corporations, the collapse of state governance in many parts of the world. But an important contributing factor is the simple lack of global coordination to address the problem. States are responsible for policing their coastlines, but much piracy occurs on the high seas—outside of any one state’s jurisdiction. Because the  oceans are a radically transnational, ungoverned space, no one state has the power or authority to quell piracy on its own.

Governments acting in concert in specific contexts have shown that maritime piracy can be controlled. Four years ago, the Straits of Malacca were the most dangerous shipping lanes in the world. Then a coordination regime between Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore reduced piracy markedly. But piracy hotspots move. At the same time that piracy declined in South Asia, it spiked off the Horn of Africa as marauders sought a more lawless region to ply their
trade. A coalition of 45 nations is now policing East Africa. But Somalia is not the only hotspot today: piracy remains a problem in South Asia and off the
coast of Nigeria.

Ultimately, as with other global problems, a global response is required. Unfortunately, no international organization exists whose responsibility is to protect shipping lanes globally or punish offenders once caught. The UN has no global police force, and was primarily designed to prevent territorial aggression among middle powers, not solve transnational security threats. In fact, the UN Charter is part of the problem: ships on the high seas cannot  legally pursue pirate boats into the territorial waters of sovereign countries. On a case-by-case basis, the UN Security Council can authorize exceptions to this rule, but this approach has not worked well in Somalia, partly because governments also need to be required to do the actual policing. And Security Council resolutions regarding Somalia cannot be transplanted to other  contexts.

The international community is also missing global rules about how to punish or deter piracy. As a crime of universal jurisdiction, piracy on the high seas is in theory punishable by any state that captures a pirate. But such trials are rare: no country wants to set a precedent for trying pirates in domestic courts, and be faced with a backlog from others bringing their own captured pirates to its jurisdiction. The International Criminal Court offers a potential venue for trying and punishing pirates, but at present its jurisdiction includes only the other universal jurisdiction crimes—genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes.

Given this political and legal vacuum, shippers are fending for themselves these days with acoustic weapons and private security personnel, in some cases arming merchant crews in their own self-defense. But these remain band-aid solutions—and they create additional risks to human life and  maritime security. Ultimately, action at the global level is necessary to protect shipping lanes and empower legitimate international actors to stamp out  piracy.

International institutions have been created to solve other global problems: nuclear proliferation, ozone depletion, pandemic disease. What might a “regime” for combating piracy look like? Whatever the means chosen, governments will need to seriously rethink the governance of the ocean over the next two decades if they are to stem the rising tide of high seas brigandry.

 

CHARLI CARPENTER teaches international relations at the University of  Massachusetts-Amherst, and blogs about war law and human security issues at Duck of Minerva and Current Intelligence. She is the author of Innocent Women and Children: Gender, Norms and the Protection of Civilians (Ashgate  Publishing, 2006).