Category Archives: Domestic Politics / Revolutions

Posts about internal politics that affect international relations, including revolutions and other changes of government

Syria Heading for Civil War?

That sound coming from Syria these days is the sound of diplomatic doors slamming shut as the country lurches toward all-out sectarian civil war. If you can hear it over the sound of government artillery shells blasting civilians in Homs…

One of these doors slammed a week ago when Russia and China vetoed the UN Security Council resolution put forward by the Arab League, which called for Syria’s president Bashar al Assad to step aside in favor of a transitional government. Russia considers Assad a friend and customer, and therefore didn’t want to side with his enemies. China never likes the idea of meddling in the internal affairs of other countries. The United States and other western powers pushed forward a resolution that Russia was sure to veto (an unwise course in my opinion), thereby giving up the potential to deliver a united message to Assad from the international community.

Assad responded by stepping up a lethal assault on neighborhoods of Homs that oppose his rule. The UN’s high commissioner for human rights today called it “an all-out assault in an effort to crush dissent with overwhelming force,” addressing the UN General Assembly where Saudi Arabia today took the case against Syria. Unfortunately nobody needs to slam the General Assembly door closed because that body has no power to do anything about the situation (as Secretary General Ban Ki Moon politely reminded the Saudis).

Yesterday the Arab League officially terminated its observer mission in Syria, another door closed. Instead it is now proposing a joint UN-Arab League observer mission in Syria. (Observers are unarmed peacekeepers, arguably the weakest form of peacekeeping force.) The proposal faces three big challenges: (1) Peacekeeping forces require the consent of the host government, which Syria says it will not grant; (2) They require authorization by the Security Council, where Russia may again use its veto; and (3) They generally can work only after a cease-fire is in place, lest they fall into a Bosnia-style dilemma of “keeping the peace where there’s no peace to keep.” So the peacekeeping door is probably firmly shut for the moment.

A cease-fire itself is no closer than ever. The opposition won’t negotiate with the regime, at least not while the killing continues. The regime does not want a cease-fire while it’s trying to use massive force to put down the opposition.

And so the violence escalates, as the government intensifies its crackdown and nonviolent protests slowly morph into an armed insurgency. Turkey and Saudi Arabia appear likely to support the opposition with arms and money, while Iran and Russia will do the same for the government.

During the Cold War, civil wars around the world were larger and longer because of the support pumped into each side by the opposing superpowers. These proxy wars faded away twenty years ago, and that is one important reason why levels of war violence have been lower around the world. But now, there is a new prospect of big powers fueling both sides in a proxy war in Syria. The fault line in Syria runs right down the Sunni-Shi’ite divide that pits Iran, Syria, and Hezbollah on one side (backed by Russia) against Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and most of the Arab League on the other (backed by the United States). Right under that fault line sits the world’s most important pool of oil, the one resource without which the world economy cannot function.

What is to be done? Well, the last deal that had legitimacy all around was the Arab League agreement with Syria last December 19 that let the monitors in and called for pulling back Syrian forces from cities, starting negotiations with the opposition, and giving human rights workers and journalists access to Syria. At the time, opposition leaders said it was just a stalling tactic by Assad, which was probably true, but nonetheless this agreement — especially the demand to pull forces back from cities under assault today — is the basis for moving forward, because Assad already agreed with it and Russia therefore can’t really oppose it.

With some effort, the western powers could line up Russian and Chinese support to put the stamp of the UN Security Council on this demand to pull out of the cities — not the demand that Assad step down — and then push measures to induce Assad to comply. Opposition leaders should be pressured to join negotiations for a cease-fire (it’s in their interest as the party being blasted), and if one can be achieved then the international community should move quickly to insert a UN peacekeeping force (I’m not so sure a joint force with the Arab League is the best way to go, given its lack of neutrality).

It may be that such an approach would fail to stop the slide into a sectarian civil war. It may fail to stop Assad’s slaughter of civilians, and on the other hand if it does stop that slaughter the Assad regime may not be able to stay in power, and a new strategy will be needed to hold the country together under a transitional government. In other words, the outcome probably will not actually be a stable cease-fire with an international peacekeeping force. But this is still the step to try next order to move forward — the step that U.S. policymakers skipped past in bringing to the UNSC what amounted to a demand for Assad’s resignation. Arming the opposition would be a disaster. Waiting and hoping is not likely to improve things. Playing “make Russia look bad” does not help the Syrians.

It is very worrisome that the Syrian conflict could ignite actual war between countries, in an unstable region at a pivotal moment, and with all that oil on the line. To my way of thinking, the best way to prevent this is to line up the international community for united, forceful diplomatic action and focus directly on reducing the violence, not just on changing the regime.

U.S. ambassador to the UN, Susan Rice, recently told Foreign Policy magazine that the conflict with Russia over Syria (and Iran) did not necessarily portend a return to the Cold War. She pointed to successful cooperation in the UNSC on Iran and North Korea sanctions, the independence of South Sudan, and the UN support of the Afghan and Iraqi governments. “There are going to be issues that are difficult. We’ve had our share of those of late and they … divide us and even get rancorous. But I don’t think is a fair characterization of the body of work that we’ve been doing over the last several years…” Point well taken — now let’s kick that U.S.-Russian cooperation into gear to steer Syria away from civil war.

 

Syria and the International Community

The international community is not, as sometimes claimed, an oxymoron. It works surprisingly well and is improving through time. This week the international community faces a new challenge and opportunity, as the Syria problem lands squarely in the UN Security Council (UNSC), where I believe the world’s conflicts should be addressed.

For most of a year the situation has escalated both on the ground and in the international response. Syria’s violent suppression of nonviolent protests has led to armed resistance by some regime opponents and threatens to escalate into sectarian civil war. More than 5,000 have died. My predictions of a protracted stalemate are proving depressingly correct.  But the international response has not been static.

At first, bilateral relations played the major role. Individual countries such as Turkey tried to intervene diplomatically to convince the Assad regime to change course and stop the violence. This did not succeed, and Turkey among others turned against Assad. (Indeed, Syria’s only important reliable friends these days are Iran and Russia.)

Next the regional organization came into play. The Arab League developed a peace plan that required the Syrian government to pull back its forces from cities (some of which would then be de facto opposition territory). Syria resisted implementing this plan, and the Arab League sent in monitors to poke around in Syria and report whether progress was occurring. It wasn’t. First the Gulf states withdrew from the monitoring mission, and then the Arab League as a whole suspended it, called for Assad to hand over power to a transitional government, and asked for action by the UN Security Council.

That’s how the matter came to be discussed this week in the UN. And there they all were — the five permanent members, this year’s ten nonpermanent members, the ambassadors of Syria and of the Arab League. To underscore its importance, the USA sent secretary of state Hillary Clinton to sit in the U.S. seat, and European countries sent foreign ministers. It is a “world order moment.” (Syria, however, used the occasion mostly to attack the Arab League and particularly Qatar, which participated in the air campaign in Libya and has led efforts to remove Assad from power in Syria.) The discussions began Tuesday, continued today behind closed doors, and are expected to culminate in a vote on Friday or Monday. Here’s is a great video summary of the situation as of Tuesday, from al Jazeera:

In these UNSC discussions, the USA and Britain have called for Assad’s ouster and the imposition of economic sanctions on Syria if the violence continues. The United States declares that it is not looking for another Libya-type resolution, which authorized force to protect civilians but was stretched to include fairly direct assistance to rebels who overthrew the government. Russia and China were upset by the stretching of the Libya resolution, and want language in any new resolution that rules out military intervention.

Russia declares that trying to change Syria’s regime by force or even by sanctions could trigger a bigger regional war, presumably along the Sunni-Shi’ite divide between Iran’s and Saudi Arabia’s allies. More fundamentally, both Russia and China have violently suppressed domestic unrest in the past, and they want the international community to uphold a strong norm of sovereignty, based in the UN Charter, that essentially says any country can do what it wants within its own borders. That old norm is being challenged of late by a new norm of sovereignty, the Responsibility to Protect, that says the international community may violate sovereign as a last resort if necessary to save civilians from mass atrocity events. The intervention in Libya was a successful application of that principle, halting an imminent massive slaughter in Benghazi, notwithstanding Russia and China’s grumbling about the later uses of air power to help the rebels overthrow Gaddafi.

Syria is no Libya, however. Russia has promised to veto any resolution that does not rule out military intervention, and this means any military intervention would have to occur without a mandate from the UN Security Council. That idea is tempting to some, and Anne-Marie Slaughter believes that the situation in Syria could become so dire as to warrant a Kosovo-style intervention, i.e. without UN authorization.

If you had a request from the Arab League backed by the protesters themselves and you had a – perhaps a super majority on the Security Council, meaning nine, 10, 11 out of the 15 vote to support, then I would be willing to countenance action even in the face of a veto as we did in Kosovo. When it comes down to this kind of humanitarian intervention, I think the rules surrounding the veto are more complicated, and there are precedents as in Kosovo for acting even in the face of a veto.

But this kind of coalition-of-the-willing action is becoming less attractive in recent years, and it seems unlikely that the west would use force against the Syrian regime without the unique legitimacy afforded by the UNSC.

My prediction (why not?) is that the international community will succeed in passing a UN resolution condemning the Syrian regime’s violence and telling Syria to halt it. Possibly it will even endorse the Arab League plan, which among other things calls on Assad to step down. It will not impose sanctions, or perhaps just weak symbolic ones, and it will make clear that the resolution does not authorize outside military force.

Daniel Serwer notes Russia’s interest in vetoing a resolution if only to look strong with an upcoming presidential election. But President Obama has his own election year and would in no way use military force against Syria, so there is not really any conflict about a Libya-style use of the UN to legitimize a western air campaign.

The western powers have every reason to want a resolution to pass, not be vetoed, and therefore they will be limited by what Russia will allow (abstaining but not vetoing). They will press for a few days to see how far they can get, and then take the deal. And that’s a good thing because it means the international community is functioning as it’s supposed to. Not good for Syrian civilians, perhaps, but good for world order. The region is unsettled and the Arab world split, so it is important for the international community to speak with one voice, and that voice is the UN Security Council.

The Sunni-Shi’ite Divide

The big fault line between Shi’ite and Sunni branches of Islam in the Middle East, centered on the rivalry of Iran and Saudi Arabia, is influencing conflicts in countries throughout the region, including Syria.

Today the Arab League monitors from the Persian Gulf states (Saudi Arabia and allies) left Syria, saying that their presence was not effectively changing the violent behavior of the Syrian regime of Bashar al Assad (backed by Iran). The rest of the Arab League monitoring mission remains, and the League as a whole extended the mission and is expected to send replacement monitors, but the League’s head also called on the UN Security Council to help out. (In my opinion the pullout is not a bad thing, as both the Gulf states and Iran are too close to Syria to play as useful a monitoring role as other Arab states or the UN might.)

The Sunni-Shi’ite conflict was simple back in the 1980s. Iran, the world’s only Islamic Republic and a Shi’ite country, was locked in a war with Iraq. The war would kill close to a million people through trench warfare, the use of chemical weapons, and rocket attacks on each other’s cities. Backing Iraq and its Sunni leader Saddam Hussein were Saudi Arabia, the other Arab countries, and tacitly the United States.

Things are actually more complicated than that. No countries are purely Sunni or Shi’ite. Most have an interwoven patchwork of these sectarian communities — a village here, a city there — as this map shows (high res here):

Map of Sunni-Hi'ite areas

Two countries next to Iran — Iraq and Bahrain — had Shi’ite majorities ruled over and repressed by Sunni minority regimes. In the past decade, of course, Iraq is no longer Sunni-led but, thanks to George W. Bush, led by Shi’ite parties.  (One U.S. official claimed that Bush didn’t know the distinction between Sunni and Shi’ite before deciding to invade Iraq.)

A step further from Iran is Syria, with a Sunni majority ruled over by a Shi’ite-based (Alawite) minority. That is the regime we are all focused on currently, the one the Arab League is monitoring to no avail. Moving along westward, Lebanon is almost half Shi’ite and that community is the base of the armed militia Hezbollah. After decades representing the disempowered and fighting Israel, and after being implicated in the 2005 assassination of Lebanon’s liberal prime minister, Hezbollah last year became the dominant party in Lebanon’s government.

To the south, meanwhile, in Bahrain last year the Shi’ite community rallied for democracy and was violently repressed with help from Saudi armed forces. The United States, whose Fifth Fleet is based in Bahrain, stayed pretty quiet. A quarter of the Saudi population is Shi’ite but they are in no position to cause trouble and the Saudi royal family has the money to buy out any discontent in the Kingdom. In Yemen, where Shi’ites make up more than 40 percent of the population, the Shi’ite Houthi tribe in the north has been in armed conflict with the central government for decades, even as Sunni al-Qaeda radicals wage war in the south.

Thus, in recent years the Arab side of the Persian Gulf (or is it the Arabian Gulf?) has remained firmly in Sunni control, while across the Gulf four countries in a line now have Shi’ite-affiliated regimes — Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon. Of these, Iraq and Lebanon have been relatively neutral on Syria (mixed interests and their own problems at home), but Iran has been the Assad regime’s most important external backer (along with more powerful but less enthusiastic Russia).

The emergence of a more solid Shi’ite bloc stretching from Iran to Lebanon is not a positive development in my view. It tends to polarize the region and to extend the ambitions of Iran, which acts in defiance of international norms on important issues. It also raises a legitimate concern that Iran’s creation of a nuclear weapon in the coming years would spark a rush by Saudi Arabia to follow suit. The danger of a terrible war between Iran and Saudi Arabia, with their respective allies, is worth worrying about.

In the middle of it all, of course, is oil. Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Russia all share one interest — they are the world’s three top oil exporters. They benefit from reliably high prices for oil on world markets (high price spikes that lead to crashes are less useful). On the other hand, both the western powers and China share an interest in a low, stable oil price. And there was China’s prime minister recently visiting Saudi Arabia, not Iran, for a friendly chat. Turns out that although China is Iran’s largest oil customer, China actually buys twice as much from Saudi Arabia, whose total oil exports are almost triple the level of Iran’s. China wants assurance, which it no doubt received, that Saudi Arabia would fill any gap in China’s supply created by new sanctions on Iran.

The United States supports the Saudi side, and Russia the Iranian side, but China really just wants oil and doesn’t care where it comes from. The main  interest of China and other consuming nations is political stability in the Middle East, to keep oil prices stable and the spigot turned permanently on. In the past, although oil is the world’s most traded commodity in terms of value, its price has seen wild swings triggered by political events like wars and revolutions. A little stability would be a really good thing for the world economy. Saudi Arabia alone has the vast reserves to keep world supplies steady even if another OPEC member stops exporting. And hence the Chinese prime minister’s visit.

As for the UN Security Council, its ability to play any meaningful role in Syria will depend entirely on Russia. As some Kremlin officials suggest their patience with Assad is wearing thin, the western powers are pressing Russia to back the Arab League’s recent call for Assad to step down. When that question comes to the Security Council, soon, Russia will have to decide exactly where it stands.

Burma Reforms Gaining Speed

Suu Kyi photo Jan. 18Today the longstanding leader of the opposition in Burma (Myanmar), Aung San Suu Kyi, officially filed papers to run for parliament in by-elections on April 1. It is another step forward in a reform process that last week saw the United States restore diplomatic relations with Burma after the government there released 651 more political prisoners including many prominent dissidents.

In most places in the world, inertia is a strong force in international relations. If a country is at war, it stays at war; if at peace it stays at peace; if repressive it stays repressive. So real and permanent changes in a country — for example, the Arab Spring successes in Tunisia and Libya — are always of note.

Is Burma experiencing real, permanent change?  It sure looks like it. U.S. Senate minority leader Mitch McConnell recently visited Burma and met the new civilian president, former general Thein Sein, and other top leaders. He said afterwards, “I’m convinced he  is a genuine reformer, and more importantly, so does Aung San Suu Kyi.” U.S. politicians closely follow the advice of Suu Kyi, winner of the Nobel Peace Prize, regarding policies such as whether to lift sanctions on Burma (not yet but moving that way). Last month Hillary Clinton met with her on a historic visit to Burma that signaled U.S. and international responsiveness to Burma’s reforms.

Last week the Burmese government signed a ceasefire deal with one of the most important of many ethnic militias that have been battling the government for decades near the borders with Thailand and China. The Karen ethnic group has battled the Burmese government for 63 years since Burma’s independence from Britain in 1948. The government also has ordered a ceasefire in its long conflict with the Kachin ethnic group, but some fighting continues.  Since 1989 the government has signed ceasefires with 17 armed ethnic groups. The government now says it hopes to end all these armed conflicts within three or four years.

Just ten months ago the military rulers of Burma gave way to a civilian government, albeit one hand-picked and largely led by themselves, after three decades of military rule. The government over those decades was one of the worst in the world. In 1988, student protests were met by lethal force in a massacre that previewed the following year’s Tian An Men protest in China. In 2007 Buddhist monks led large-scale demonstrations against the regime, which were also broken up with lethal force and repression.

An election in 1990 — the last until the flawed elections in 2010 — was swept by Suu Kyi’s party. Instead of allowing them to rule, the military took over, jailed opponents, and put Suu Kyi herself under house arrest for years at a time. Over the decades, the military leadership and its friends have enriched themselves greatly by exploiting Burma’s great natural resources such as timber and minerals, often sending these to its main supporter, China — which also gets electricity from Burmese hydroelectric dams. (But in September Burma cancelled an extremely unpopular $3 billion dam project backed by China. Burma had also found common ground with North Korea in recent years, reportedly buying missiles and possibly nuclear assistance from the North Koreans. Mitch McConnell said yesterday that Burma’s leaders “understand that a big part of normalizing the relationship with the United States is to discontinue its relationship with North Korea.”

The Wall Street Journal cautions that about a thousand political prisoners remain behind bars, including many associated with the country’s armed ethnic groups, and repressive laws remain in force. As for the April vote, with only about 10 percent of the parliament seats up for election, Suu Kyi’s party cannot take power even if it sweeps the vote. That would have to wait for constitutional reforms or the next regular elections in five years. The military rulers passed a new constitution in 2008 ensuring their continuing stay in power, and 2010 elections were not credible and were boycotted by the opposition.

Notwithstanding the long road still ahead, Burma’s political change in recent months has been breathtaking. Why does a country lurch toward freedom after decades of authoritarianism? Often the answer seems to be personal. In Burma, Aung San Suu Kyi has remained steadfast, totally committed to nonviolence, and has reached out on a personal level to the military rulers. She is Burma’s Nelson Mandela (or, you might say, Burma’s Aung San Suu Kyi). For his part, president Thein Sein has personally pushed the country in a new direction.

The world’s “rogue” regimes cause turbulence disproportional to their apparent size and power in the international system.  But their numbers are decreasing, with Libya now off the list and Burma seeming to be moving with determination to end its isolation. Iran (75 million people) is becoming more isolated with new sanctions hitting its economy hard and its currency losing half its value in recent weeks. , North Korea (25 million) is in an uncertain leadership transition. Syria (20 million) has a government fighting for survival against its own people. Saddam’s Iraq is a distant memory. All these countries tried, or at least started, to develop nuclear weapons.

Truly these are tough times for rogue states and their isolated elites. Add in the various dead or deposed dictators and terrorists over the past year, and the picture looks grim indeed for today’s embattled authoritarians. Burma’s president shows both wisdom and pragmatism to get off the sinking ship and start the country of 50 million people in a new direction.

Three Situations to Watch

So let’s start out the new year with a look around at three issues that matter in international relations currently.  My short list is:  Interest rates in Italy; invective in Iran; and stalemate in Syria.

euro zone graphic1. The euro debt crisis grinds on but is looking up a bit this week. Last week the Italian government successfully sold bonds at lower interest rates. When investors are willing to loan money to Italy at a lower rate, this is a signal that the market sees less risk of an Italian collapse. Italy, like Greece, has a new technocrat-led government. But unlike Greece, Ireland, or Portugal, which all recently received large bailouts to keep them from defaulting on debts, Italy is too big to bail out. So the edging away from a financial meltdown is important.

Italy’s success was followed by successful bond issues in the Netherlands and, today, Portugal and Germany. (Germany borrowed $5 billion at below 2 percent interest.) Europe’s financial situation remains tenuous, however. One big worry is that the austerity measures governments are taking to deal with debt will choke off economic growth and drive Europe’s economies into another recession.

2. Iran has been in the news a lot lately. The government keeps creeping closer to the ability to build a nuclear weapon, and Western governments keep tightening up the various sanctions that are supposed to pressure Iran to change course. The Iranian leadership has been turning up the rhetoric in response, most recently by threatening to close down the straits of Hormuz – an international waterway next to Iran that carries a truly huge amount of oil from the Persian Gulf to the rest of the world. Iran has the capability to carry out the threat, but would be completely crazy to do so. It would be an act of war that would bring in a coalition of Iran’s enemies from Saudi Arabia to the United States, to turn the oil spigot back on.

Iran’s leaders must feel pressured, to be sure. The Stuxnet computer worm (apparently a U.S.-Israeli project) set back their uranium enrichment program, perhaps by a couple of years. Top Iranian scientists in the nuclear program have been attacked, one killed, on the streets of Tehran. A huge explosion, still unexplained, devastated a major missile testing facility and killed the head of the missile program. The United States has been flying drones deep into Iran to spy on activities there, as we all learned a month ago when one either crashed or was shot down by Iran (another case of “still unexplained”). The UN’s atomic energy agency has put out reports accusing Iran of pursuing nukes, and the UN Security Council has imposed sanctions, with much more serious sanctions imposed by the United States and European countries. The domestic opposition to Iran’s leaders was crushed after massive protests two years ago, but smolders still.

Will the pressure induce Iran to change course and give up its quest for nuclear weapons? This seems pretty unlikely, barring a change of regime in Iran (which itself falls in the “pretty unlikely” category). Military action (e.g. by the USA or Israel) might slow the process, but as of right now the single most likely outcome of this situation is that Iran will have nuclear weapons in a few years, and perhaps successfully deploy them on capable missiles in a few more years.

A less likely possibility, but an interesting one, is that regional negotiations could produce a nuclear-free zone in which Israel gives up its nuclear weapons and others such as Iran give up the idea of obtaining them. Before you dismiss this idea as utopian, have a look at the poll last month showing 64 percent of Israeli Jews actually favor it.

3. Syria continues to be extremely important but completely stuck in a rut. The latest hope was that an Arab League monitoring mission would induce the government to stop slaughtering protesters and opponents. But the killings continued. The Assad regime has enough support, including the solid support of the top ranks of the military, to hold onto power. But the opposition has enough support to continue its protests.

It is unclear at this point whether the Syrian situation will morph into a civil war as the opposition gives up on peaceful protest and puts its faith in armed insurrection under the Free Syrian Army. So far the armed attacks on the government have not constituted a serious threat – they are more symbolic and sporadic, albeit deadly – and the rebels do not control territory. There is no chance the international community will intervene Libya-style.

These three issues – European debt, Iran’s arguments with other countries, and Syria’s protests – are in different issue areas of international relations: political economy, security affairs, and domestic politics, respectively. There are also important developments currently in environmental politics, North-South relations, and information technologies, which I will blog about in the future. So the action in IR currently is spread across many parts of the field.  That should make for an extremely interesting year. Admittedly, 2011 was a hard act to follow, but let’s see if 2012 can give it a run for the money.

Is Syria at War?

Assad interview photoViolence continues to escalate in Syria. The opposition Free Syria Army, consisting of defectors from the army, has engaged in several lethal clashes with government forces recently. Until now I have not included Syria on my list of wars in progress, but I am edging closer to adding it.

To be considered a war, an armed conflict must pit two armed groups against each other, contesting territory or control of government, with the repeated use of lethal force. Peace researchers who count wars do not include “one-sided violence” and most of Syria’s lethal violence this year has been just that. Now, with the emergence of the Free Syria Army, Syria is moving toward a civil war. Yemen had a somewhat similar profile (unarmed protesters plus armed tribesmen and a defecting portion of the army), but Yemen was already on the war list because of two other longstanding armed conflicts there.

In the Syrian case, I have been waiting to see if this move toward civil war is sustained. Right now the actual lethal armed clashes between two fighting forces are at a very low level and sporadic. Today’s armed clashes involving the Free Syria Army reportedly killed between 8 and 18 people. And this week ugly sectarian killings in the city of Homs, heart of the opposition, took dozens of lives. Government violence against unarmed protesters continues as well, with protesters today holding a general strike and the government using force against them. The UN estimates that 4,000 people have died in the 9-month-long Syrian uprising, the vast majority clearly being unarmed demonstrators killed by government security forces.

The Syrian unrest is beginning to destabilize the neighborhood. On Friday a bomb in southern Lebanon wounded five French peacekeepers, and the French foreign minister has now accused Syria of being behind the attack. The Lebanese armed group, and leading political party, Hezbollah, has reaffirmed its strong support for its longtime patron, Syrian president Assad. In Jordan this weekend, anti-Assad demonstrators stormed the Syrian embassy and injured two diplomats. Meanwhile Syria’s strongest regional ally, Iran, is going through a turbulent period with new international sanctions against its nuclear weapons program. Syria’s vice president thanked Iran today for its steadfast support of the Assad regime.

If Syria keeps moving in the current direction, there is much to worry about and I will be adding the country to my list of wars in progress. I do not want to do so before it is really clear that Syria is in a civil war. The UN’s top human rights official said just that earlier this month. But at the moment Syria is just hovering at the brink of a real civil war and I do not want to assume the worst.

The question may be decided in the next few days though. On Saturday the government gave an ultimatum to the opposition in its stronghold of Homs — stop holding demonstrations, turn in weapons, and hand over defecting members of Syria’s army. Obviously those things are not going to happen. The “or else” is a bombardment of the city by government forces. When Assad’s father faced a serious armed uprising by Islamist militants in the city of Hama in 1982, he flattened it with artillery, killing tens of thousands of people.

The bizarre topping on the week’s Syria news was an interview that Assad gave with ABC News’s Barbara Walters — his first with an American journalist since the protests began nine months ago. Denying everything, Assad said he did not give orders for a crackdown and that most of the people killed were his government’s forces. His response to the UN’s estimate of 4,000 deaths was “Who said that the United Nations is a credible institution?” At times he seemed out of touch with reality — realities like the Arab League has taken unprecedented steps to sanction him; his former ally Turkey has turned against him; the European Union and United States oppose him; and Syrians continue to march in the streets against him after nine months of violent repression including murder, torture, and imprisonment.

Assad declared, “We don’t kill our people… no government in the world kills its people, unless it’s led by a crazy person.” I’m not saying Assad is crazy, but without a doubt he’s killing his own people. And now they’re starting to shoot back. This is probably going to get worse before it gets better.

Egypt’s Election and Islamism

Ballots in Egypt Dec. 2011The results of the Egyptian election are in, though not complete, and two Islamist parties have scored big victories. The Muslim Brotherhood, a long-established and well-organized point of opposition to Mubarak over the years, leads the voting as expected with about 37 percent. What was not expected was the strong showing for the Salafists, a more conservative Islamist group, with about 25 percent, outpolling the liberal, secular parties. As the traditional center of the Arab world and a country of 80 million people, Egypt will set the direction of political Islam far beyond its borders.

This round of elections will choose only about 30 percent of the seats in parliament so it’s too soon to say how a new government will shake out. But I’m not convinced that “the Islamists” — representing the more moderate Brotherhood and the more radical Salafists (and a third party with about 5 percent) — is the right category for thinking about this. In 1962 the political scientist William Riker developed the theory of minimum winning coalitions. It predicts basically that if the Muslim Brotherhood is going to lead a government, it may turn to smaller parties, perhaps the liberal secularists, to get over 51 percent. The #2 winner, the Salafists, would exact a greater price (in cabinet positions, for example) for their participation, whereas the liberals would take what they could get.

In addition, the Salafists put the Brotherhood in an awkward position in defining the role of Islam in Egyptian society. The Salafists’ success, according to the NY Times, presents “a challenge to the Muslim Brotherhood, in part by plunging it into a polarizing Islamist-against-Islamist debate over the application of Islamic law in Egypt’s promised democracy, a debate the Brotherhood had worked hard to avoid.”

And indeed, today the Salafists came out with a statement that they would not water down their views to join a Brotherhood-led government. They oppose a secular state and insist on sharia law. Ed Husain writes in The Atlantic that they pose an extreme danger and terrify many Egyptians.

Israelis are worried that the Islamist turn in Egypt will spell trouble from its long-time stable ally. Israel has seen Islamism turn Iran from an ally to a bitter enemy after 1979, and more recently saw free elections in Palestine bring to power the Islamist movement Hamas, which has also been a bitter enemy. A former Israeli ambassador to Egypt called the changes in the region an “Islamic tsunami,” which actually does not seem too far from reality.

However, as the Egyptian elections clearly illustrate, there is not one Islamism in the region, but several. Three states have Islamist leaders but follow very different models. Saudi Arabia is most closely related to Egyptian Salafists, and follows a very conservative domestic politics in such matters as women’s rights and sharia law. Iran is an Islamic Republic but Saudi Arabia’s great enemy — reflecting the Shia-Sunni divide. Turkey is the model that resonates most in the region, with an Islamist leader but capitalist economy, connections with the West (Turkey is a NATO member), and a deepening respect for human rights. That is the model followed by Tunisia’s recently successful party that won elections there, and the model of the Brotherhood in Egypt.

With all these models competing, and others that do not have control of a state (the failed al Qaeda model still limping along in Yemen and Somalia), the label “Islamist” does not clarify Middle East politics very much. What divides Islamists is as important as what unites them.

Clinton’s Burma Gambit

Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has arrived in Burma (Myanmar) on the first such visit by a high U.S. official in fifty years. As Burma embarks on reforms, the United States wants to encourage progress and perhaps pry Burma away from China a bit. But after decades of a repressive military regime there, the U.S. attitude is what one official called “deeply realistic.”

Several issues of concern are on the agenda. Most important is the beginning of democratic reforms in Burma, symbolized by the release of hundreds of political prisoners and of the longstanding opposition leader, Nobel Peace Prize winner Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, after years of house arrest. She is planning to participate in upcoming elections, and Clinton is to have a private dinner with her, which is kind of a big deal. (The fact that the two most important people in this story are women is also a sign of the times.) Burma’s new president seems to be genuinely reform-minded, though it’s hard to know how far or fast the process will proceed.

The United States is concerned about reports that Burma has been buying missiles from North Korea. And there is also still a little civil war going on in the north of the country, between the government and ethnic rebels who want more autonomy. The ethnic groups close to several of Burma’s borders have waged decades of low-level war, and there are tens of thousands of refugees as a result. But the government has recently negotiated on cease-fire deals with two of them. This video gives the feel of the fighting still going on in the north:

Another subtext of the trip is China. The United States has been openly stating that its focus is pivoting to the Asia-Pacific region, and its actions resemble a “containment” strategy aimed at China. The Chinese certainly see the U.S. opening to Burma in that light.

Strong U.S. economic sanctions on Burma remain in place, but historically they have followed the lead of Suu Kyi, who might call for their relaxation as a reward for the government’s thaw (she is astute in the uses of reciprocity). So I predict an easing of the U.S. sanctions fairly soon (not right away because this will require U.S. Congressional action), contrary to the statements of U.S. officials that nothing will change soon.

As Woody Allen once said, eighty percent of life is just showing up. If that’s so, then Hillary Clinton has already achieved most of what this trip can accomplish.

Congo’s Good-Enough Election

DRC election postersMonday is election day in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, with the presidency and parliament to be decided. These will be Congo’s second democratic elections after decades of dictatorship and war (the first was in 2006). There is plenty to criticize in the elections but they are an important step forward for the impoverished country of 70 million people.

President Joseph Kabila is expected to win re-election (with the opposition squawking that it’s unfair), while in the Parliamentary election 19,000 candidates are competing for 500 seats. The 2006 election was organized by the UN, but this one the Congolese government is running by itself, with just a smallish monitoring mission from the EU as outside help. Logistical problems are a challenge in the very large country with few decent roads — ballots were held up when bad weather delayed flights to remote locations.

Clashes between supporters and opponents of the president, and security forces, reportedly killed eight people in the capital. Yesterday the main opposition candidate Etienne Tshisekedi returned to Congo from South Africa, and his supporters flocked to the airport to greet him. But police would not let him proceed for eight hours. EU observers criticized the police action as a “serious breach of the right to campaign.” For his part, Tshisekedi a few weeks ago declared himself already president, which is not a helpful style of campaigning. The government responded by shutting down the radio station that aired the interview. Today the government cancelled all political rallies to head off violence (and maybe to keep the opposition from gaining ground).

One indicted war criminal being held in the Hague is running for president, and another, indicted for mass rapes in eastern Congo but at large, is running for a seat in parliament. So there’s plenty to criticize in the conduct of the elections.

But, as I always like to say, compared to what? In this case the answer is not compared to a perfect democracy, not even compared to the USA (ahem, Bush v. Gore), but compared to what came before — 70 years of colonialism, 30 years of dictatorship, and a decade of horrific war, all against a backdrop of absolutely wrenching poverty.

Many people criticize the United Nations peacekeeping mission in the Congo, because atrocities still occur in some eastern provinces, including the ever newsworthy mass rapes. Poverty and corruption are still rampant and yes, the elections are imperfect. But when the UN arrived a little over a decade ago, there were six foreign armies fighting “Africa’s first world war” in the Congo. The economy was in reverse, mortality was rising dramatically, sexual violence was widespread, and democracy was not even a remote possibility. Most of these problems have not been 100% solved in a decade — surprise — but most of them have been moving in the right direction. Considering the size and funding of the UN mission compared to the size and challenges of the country, the peacekeepers have made fabulous progress. Their work isn’t done, but maybe we should think about giving them more resources to do a better job, not just complain that they are a failure.

An official with the Carter Center says Congo’s electoral commission has “gotten through a relatively successful campaign period. Yes, there have been some major incidents and some deaths, but these I don’t think have resulted in a mass, public rejection of the electoral process. Far from it.”

So let’s give two cheers for a modestly successful election tomorrow in the Congo, and refocus on helping the troubled country move forward step by step.

 

Yemen’s President Resigns!

In a long-awaited and much-delayed milestone of the Arab Spring, Yemen’s president, Ali Abdullah Saleh, has signed the peace agreement that removes him from office. He signed on in Saudi Arabia today and has told the UN secretary-general that he plans to travel to New York for medical treatment.

Saleh’s resignation comes after nine months of street protests against him, violent repressed by his government. Parts of the military also defected from his side, creating a threat of civil war. And al-Qaeda-affiliated militants in the south of the country took advantage of the chaos to seize territory (although several of their key leaders have been killed by U.S. drone attacks this fall). Just today three Red Cross workers were kidnapped in southern Yemen.

Several times earlier this year Saleh promised to sign the deal, brokered by nearby Gulf states, only to back away. Saleh was almost killed by a bomb in June and went to Saudi Arabia for medical treatment, but recovered and returned to Yemen. He seemed to be the cat with nine lives, but today those lives finally expired.

Under the peace deal, power will be transferred to vice president Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi and presidential elections will take place within 90 days. Saleh will get immunity from prosecution. For two years a national unity government will hold power and work on revisions to the constitution.

The street protesters are not content with Saleh’s departure, as they want broader political changes and an end to corruption. Nonetheless, the ouster of the fourth Arab leader by the Arab Spring protests this year — following those in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya — stands as an important marker of the change that has swept the Middle East this year.

Yemen matters to the United States because it is the poorest Arab country and a hotbed of Islamic militancy, including plots directed against the United States (such as the “underwear bomber” and printer-cartridge plots). It also sits next to the Hormuz Straits through which Persian Gulf oil must pass en route to Western markets.